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Abstract
If "tax progression is good for employment in popular models of trade union behaviour"
(Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996), then a flat−rate premium, as proposed as a means of funding
for public health care, is bad. This note shows that replacing existing (proportional) social
security contributions by a lump−sum payment increases labour costs and thus reduces
employment. This result holds − for empirically relevant parameters − even in a more general
case than the one considered by Koskela and Vilmunen. Policy advisers should be aware that
in imperfect competitive labour markets the prima facie attractiveness of a flat−rate premium
is not for sure.
Citation: Feil, Michael T., (2006) "Funding public health care: A flat−rate premium might be bad for employment." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 3 pp. 1−10
Submitted: February 28, 2006.  Accepted: March 23, 2006.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2006/volume10/EB−06J50002A.pdf1 Introduction
Funding of social security in Europe has come under pressure, the health care system is
a case in point. In particular in countries with low or only moderate economic growth
the strain on revenues is strong. Expenditures have been rising steadily due to additional
demand for health care services and ageing populations. In countries where funding
is very closely connected to the total wage bill, like in France or Germany, poor labour
market performance has started what some call "the erosion of the ￿nancial basis", which
in turn leads to an increasing tax burden on remaining jobs. This tax burden has been
suspected, though, ￿ actually since quite a long time ￿ of being a major impediment
to employment growth and thus a major cause of high unemployment ￿gures (see e.g.
OECD, 1995).1
One speci￿c idea to lower the tax burden and to promote employment is the re-
placement of earnings-dependent contributions by a ￿ at-rate premium. For Germany the
Council of Economic Advisors for instance is favouring such a step. The Netherlands have
just introduced ￿xed payments as one element of funding. In terms of public economics
the replacement of a payroll tax by a lump-sum tax is proposed.2 This proposal has the
obvious appeal of a sharp cut in marginal tax rates. In opposition to other proposals that
try to include additional sources of income, such as interest, capital gains or rents, there
is, at least in theory, an obvious e¢ ciency gain.
The textbook arguments for the introduction of a ￿ at-rate premium are straightfor-
ward, at least in the basic perfect market model. Cutting the marginal tax rate and
raising a lump-sum tax to assure equal yield, raises labour supply and leads to more
employment at lower gross wages. It is this replacement of a distorting second-best tax
on which the alleged predominance of the ￿ at-rate premium is based.
The dominance of the premium, however, hinges crucially on the assumption of per-
fect competition and can thus be strongly ￿ awed. This note shows that in "popular
models" of trade union behaviour the ￿ at-rate premium causes completely adverse e⁄ects
by increasing wages and reducing employment. In doing so the line of reasoning that the
structure of taxation matters is a little lengthened.
2 The algebra of tax progression
The following argumentation is presented in the form used by Koskela and Vilmunen
(1996). The analysis is just an application of their model.
The model consists of a representative trade union and a ￿rm (or an association of







1For a survey of taxation and employment see e.g. Nickell and Layard, 1999, or Bovenberg, 2003.
The extent to which wage-related contributions can be treated as taxes is an interesting question. I
assume, rather roughly, as it is now common in many papers, that social security contributions are
equivalent to a proportional income or payroll tax.
2In Germany contributions have to be paid only up to a certain threshold. Contributions are thus
equivalent to a proportional income tax up to this level. The threshold also roughly marks an income
level that entitles the worker to leave the compulsory public system and to opt for private insurance.
1with @u0
@w = 0, @u0
@L = 0, where u(wn) is utility derived from net income (wn), u0 is the
union￿ s fallback position and L is employment (of union members).3
In what follows I am concentrating on the monopoly-union and the right-to-manage
case, but the results also hold for the e¢ cient-bargaining model. Assuming that the
number of hours per worker is ￿xed and normalising it (e.g. per year) to 1, we can write
net income as (abstracting from all other sources of income)
w
n = (1 ￿ s ￿ ￿)w + ￿a ￿ p (2)
where:
w := labour cost or earned (gross) income
s := social security contribution rate
￿ := marginal income tax rate
a := tax exemption (basic allowance)
p := health care premium (￿ at rate)
Throughout the text I will use the words wage(s), wage rate and income interchangeably.
Actually w stands for the cost per one unit of labour (per worker). I de￿ne ~ ￿ = ￿ + s
as the combined marginal tax. Note that it is assumed that there is a linear income
tax function, thus progression is indirect, since the marginal income tax rate is constant.
More general tax schedules are discussed at the end of this section.
The reform proposal consists ￿ in a stylised form ￿ of a decrease in s (ds < 0) and
the introduction of p.4 Initially I assume that every worker pays p and that pL = ￿wLds,
i.e. revenues are identical under both systems.5 The labour force is homogeneous. The
relaxation of these assumptions is discussed in the next section.
The average tax rate is de￿ned as
t = 1 ￿
wn
w




From (2) and (3) it is obvious that any increase in p is equivalent to a decrease of a. In
fact the corresponding change in p is
dp = ￿￿da
Numerical example: Let ￿ = 0:4 and a = 7500 EUR, then the introduction of a ￿ at-rate
health care premium of dp = p = 2400 EUR is equivalent to a decrease of a by 6000
EUR.
To the reader who is familiar with the literature on taxation and (un)employment the ef-
fects of the ￿ at-rate premium are now already obvious: Taxation becomes less progressive,
which is not "good for employment".
3Boeters (2004) calls this version of the income argument the "no alternative employment variant",
since the outside option u0 does not depend on (un-)employment. See his paper for a discussion of the
importance of the union￿ s fallback option.
4For actual reform proposals ￿p = p holds, i.e. there is no ￿ at-rate premium in the initial situation.
The anlysis is nevertheless undertaken in the form of marginal changes to stay in the framework of
Koskela and Vilmunen (1996).
5The analysis abstracts from the fact that in many actual systems contributions are formally paid by
both, employers and employees. However, this simplica￿on does not change neither the analysis nor the
results in principal.
2Formal analysis
Formally the total wage e⁄ect can be decomposed into the change caused by the intro-
duction of the premium (dp) and the decrease of the contribution rate (ds = d~ ￿). Note
that the income tax schedule is left unchanged. This might not be the case in actual
reform plans.
dw = w~ ￿d~ ￿ + wpdp (4)
It can be shown (see the appendix) that an increase in p leads to an increase of the wage,
thus wp = dw
dp > 0.6 The e⁄ect of the cut in the total marginal tax rate w~ ￿ = dw
d~ ￿ is per
se indetermined. Corresponding to the Slutsky decomposition in consumer theory, there
is a ￿ substitution e⁄ect￿(wc
~ ￿), which is negative and an ￿ income e⁄ect￿ , which is positive.
Note that for the derivation of the ￿ substitution e⁄ect￿trade union utility is held constant
(see the appendix).
Koskela and Vilmunen derive the result that "tax progression is good for employment"
under the condition of an unchanged tax revenue, dT = 0, with T = ￿ (w ￿ a)L. Their
approach combines changes in the tax rate and the tax exemption in such way as to isolate
the e⁄ect of a pure change in the marginal tax rate. Equivalent to dT = 0 in the case of
the health-care premium is dS + dT = 0, where S = swL + pL. I set dT = 0, assuming
that changes of the income tax schedule are not part of the reform package, leaving the
contribution rate and the ￿ at-rate premium as the only ￿scal means. Equation (20) of

















where ￿ = ￿Lw
w
L is the elasticity of labour demand.
Proposition 1 The wage e⁄ect of a change in the combined marginal tax rate ~ ￿ is neg-
ative, if the tax revenue is constant.
Proof. The pure substitution e⁄ect is negative.
w
c
~ ￿ = w~ ￿ ￿ wpw < 0 (6)
The sign of (5) is thus unambiguously determined by the denominator.








Total di⁄erencing of S with respect to w and p yields:





















If we assume dS
dp > 0, i.e. there is no La⁄er e⁄ect and the revenue increases with a higher
premium, then LD > 0 and D > 0.
6Note that in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) the tax exemption is the parameter of interest. The sign
of the derivative is therefore reversed.
3From (5) we can conclude that a drop of ~ ￿ which is fully compensated by an increase in
p (i.e. dS = 0) unambiguously raises the wage rate w. This is just the Kosekela-Vilmunen
result turned upside down.
So far we have been arguing strictly speaking within the monopoly union model. The
argumentation for the right-to-manage model, however, is also based on (5) and thus
very similar. The results directly carry over. (See the appendix for the algebra.) In the
e¢ cient-bargaining model the proof is more complicated. However, from the discussion
above it should be clear that apart from some notational di⁄erences the policy of interest
is equivalent to the case analysed by Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) and their results
directly carry over.
Until now the tax function has taken the linear form with indirect progression. Actual
tax systems typically consist of at least a few di⁄erent brackets or even show continu-
ously increasing (up to a maximum) marginal tax rates.7 This makes the marginal tax
rate a function of w with T 00 (w) > 0. This modi￿cation however does not change the
fundamental result. The endogenous increase of the marginal tax rate, that will then
occur, however dampens the wage rise.
Summing up we can say that in "popular models of trade union behaviour" the pro-
posal to fund public health care by a ￿ at-rate premium causes completely adverse e⁄ects
by increasing wages and reducing employment, just as the work by Koskela and Vilmunen,
and others predicts. One should, however, bear in mind that these popular models are
not per se adequate descriptions of actual economies. See Boeters (2004) for a discussion
of di⁄erent models.
3 Heterogeneity and combinations of marginal and average tax rate e⁄ects
One obvious shortcoming of the previous analysis is its ignorance with respect to hetero-
geneity. It is not the use of representative agents per se, that is problematic, it is rather
the fact that the premium exactly amounts to the average tax relief, i.e. the equal-yield
condition is re￿ ected on a one-to-one basis at the level of the representative agent. This
is of course a very particular case. Since the policy proposals include ￿ at least for
Germany ￿ the liability of all adults to the premium, whether being in or out of the
labour force, the tax burden of the representative union member can di⁄er before and
after the reform. This is most obvious for single-earner couples, who under the current
system pro￿t from the free coverage of the non-working spouse. Note that with this more
realistic feature of the reform package p￿ L 6= ￿wLds, either because the number of people
liable to the premium (￿ L) is not equal to the number of workers (L) or because of some
other measures to balance the budget of the statutory insurance.
Another point is whether the unemployed are also liable. If they were, the result
would be quite di⁄erent, since the di⁄erence between net earnings and the outside option
would not change (much). It is well known that in the case where unemployment bene￿ts
are taxed the same way as earned income, the wage e⁄ect of taxation is strongly reduced
(see e.g. Bovenberg, 2003). Yet this case is fairly irrelevant in practice, since all versions
of the ￿ at-rate premium proposal include what is usually called "social compensation".
Thus people with low incomes will not have to pay the full premium. Therefore it is very
likely that the premium will be smaller for the unemployed.
7Note however that the tax function used in the formal analysis is the now often discussed ￿ at tax.
4In the simple model of the previous section we assumed that workers are identical.
Another interpretation of the trade union￿ s utility function is that of its median member.
Let us consider the case where for the representative union member ￿wds 6= p. So
either the representative union member enjoys a tax relief or su⁄ers from a higher tax
burden. In contrast to the previous analysis marginal and average tax rates now vary
simultaneously. Thus we no longer stick to the idea of isolating the e⁄ect of a change in
progression by holding the average tax rate constant.8
Proposition 2 For empirical relevant parameters, decreasing the proportional contribu-
tion rate (s) and introducing a lump-sum premium (p) increases the wage rate, even if
dS 6= 0.








where +=￿ indicates the sign of the individual terms. By de￿nition of the reform proposal
ds < 0 and dp > 0. We have seen before that wp > 0. In general the sign of ws is
indetermined. But since
w~ ￿ = w
c
~ ￿ + wpw
= (Vww)
￿1 L + (Vww)
￿1 Lww
= (Vww)
￿1 L[1 ￿ ￿] (8)
and Vww < 0 by the second order condition for an optimum, the sign of this expression
only depends on the elasticity of labour demand (￿). Note that (8) is derived under the
assumption that u(w(1 ￿ ~ ￿) + ￿a ￿ p) = w(1 ￿ ~ ￿) + ￿a ￿ p, which is a very common
form of union utility in the literature. The overall wage e⁄ect is then given by
dw = (w
c
~ ￿ + wpw)ds + wpdp
= (Vww)
￿1 [Lds + Lw (wds + dp)] (9)
If jdpj > jwdsj, i.e. the premium is higher than the wage-based contributions, then
dw > 0 always holds, since ds < 0 and Lw < 0 and thus
Lds + Lw (wds + dp) < 0
But even if the premium makes up only a portion of the tax relief, i.e. jdpj < jwdsj the





















8The analysis thus departs from the direction of Koskela and Vilmunen (1996). We are no longer
interested in isolating the pure progressivity e⁄ect, but want to know the total e⁄ect of a change in the
marginal and the average tax rate.
5the result is reversed and wages fall. If e.g. ! = jdp=wdsj = 0:5, then the elasticity of
labour demand must be smaller than -2 (￿ > 2) in order to reverse the result. If the
premium was only :2 of the previous contribution, the elasticity must be still larger than
1.25 in absolute value. For empirical relevant values of ￿ and ! constellations such that
dw > 0 can be ruled out.9
The intuition behind the more general result is that in the ￿rst case, where the
premium exceeds the wage-based contributions, the total e⁄ect is the e⁄ect under the
constant-revenue condition plus a pure income e⁄ect wp > 0. In this case the total wage
e⁄ect is de￿nitely negative.
In the second case things are a bit more di¢ cult. A lower average tax rate, i.e. a
small premium, gives the union an incentive to set a lower wage rate. How big the tax
reduction must be, in order to o⁄set the negative e⁄ect of a smaller marginal tax rate
depends on the "terms of trade", i.e. the possibility to trade income for employment.
The stronger labour demand reacts to changes in labour cost, the smaller this incentive
(the lower average tax burden) has to be. If labour demand is less elastic, the union will
not get enough employment in return for a wage decrease.
Obviously Proposition 2 only holds in general, if very high values for ￿ and small
numbers of ! can be ruled out. While the latter can be simply assumed to be true
for reasonable reform proposals and typical models of union representation, the former
deserves further discussion. In general the elasticity of labour demand depends on two
major aspects: (i) The source of economic rents. (ii) The set-up of collective bargaining.10




where ￿c is the elasticity of labour demand under constant output, ￿ is labour￿ s share in
total cost and ￿ the elasticity of output demand. Note that ￿c > 0 and ￿ > 0 are de￿ned
in the same as ￿. If rents stem from imperfect competition, then the elasticity of output
demand ￿, is the crucial parameter, since in this case ￿ is quite large. An alternative
source of pure pro￿ts is the existence of a ￿xed factor. The following table classi￿es the
four cases that result as combinations of (i) and (ii).
source of rents
bargaining level ￿xed factor market power
￿rm ￿ = ￿c < 1 ￿ ￿ 1
industry ￿ < 1 ￿ / 1
The ￿xed factor and the market power hypotheses are treated as polar cases, i.e.
they exclude each other. The table rests upon theoretic arguments as well as empirical
evidence (see e.g. Hamermesh, 1993), leaving ￿rm-level bargaining in imperfect goods
market as the only potentially relevant case for a high elasticity. On empirical grounds,
however, this constellation is the exception not the rule. In European countries bargaining
9Note that ￿ > 1 in the Koskela-Vilmunen model. This is typical for models of monopolistic compe-
tition. It always holds under a single-input technology with decreasing returns to scale, which can be
interpreted as short-run demand.
10Note that the monopoly union model can be thought of as a limiting case of the right-to-manage
model, where the union has all the bargaining power.
6is mostly located at the industry level, sometimes with a spatial dimension. It can also
be found in a highly centralised form on the national level.
Summing up we can say that only for a very limited, yet empirically irrelevant, set
of parameters the general result derived in the previous section does not hold. With
inelastic labour demand the general result carries over to all cases with dp 6= ￿wds. Only
if the premium accounts for a small fraction of the contributions, a negative wage e⁄ect
might occur. But since the ratio in practice will be around one, we can conclude that
also in the case where dp = ￿wds does not hold, the reform proposal will unambiguously
cause adverse wage e⁄ects.
A slightly more complex case is given, if the union behaviour is determined by some
sort of average income and fallback position instead of the median values. In this case
the whole distributions of net income and outside options determine in a weighted form
trade union behaviour. However, if union preferences are not of a very peculiar form ￿
giving large weight to speci￿c groups of the distribution ￿ it appears rather unlikely that
the wage e⁄ect will be reversed.
4 Conclusion
A fundamental change in the funding of public health care systems, by switching from a
current pay-as-you-go system ￿nanced by proportional taxes to one funded by a ￿ at-rate
premium is no guarantee for more employment. On the contrary, adverse wage e⁄ects of
a less progressive system of taxation can arise leading to less employment. This is not
only the case for the rather obvious situation where the equal-yield condition, which is
very likely to be part of such a reform, is perfectly re￿ ected on the individual level of
trade union agents. Even if the average tax burden is reduced, there is only very limited
support for expectations of employment gains.
However, this rather pessimistic result rests on two quite strong assumptions: (i) the
trade union￿ s outside option is ￿xed, (ii) only employed workers have to pay the ￿ at-
rate premium, not the unemployed. Against this background it should be clear that this
note has focused on one particular mechanism that has to be considered in assessing the
proposal of a ￿ at-rate premium. There are other aspects and economic e⁄ects that can
potentially reverse the result presented here, in addition to the caveats already mentioned.
The need for further research is hence fairly obvious. In addition to a more general
discussion of the e⁄ects brought about by collective bargaining over incomes, a next step
will be to look at economic mechanisms that counteract the negative e⁄ects found here.




Let trade union utility be described by
V =
￿
w(1 ￿ ~ ￿) + ￿a ￿ p ￿ u
0￿
L (A.1)
with ￿rst order condition
Vw = (1 ￿ ~ ￿)L +
￿
w(1 ￿ ~ ￿) + ￿a ￿ p ￿ u
0￿
Lw = 0 (A.2)
By the implicit function theorem we can derive




￿1 (￿L ￿ wLw) = (Vww)
￿1 L[1 ￿ ￿] (A.3)








The next step is to derive what Koskela and Vilmunen (1996, p.68) call the "Slutsky
equation for the wage rate". This is a decomposition of the total wage e⁄ect caused by
a change of ~ ￿ in a substitution and an income e⁄ect. The substitution e⁄ect isolates the
e⁄ect of the change in the marginal tax rate.
To derive the decomposition we start with the following identity
w(~ ￿;g (~ ￿;￿)) = w
c (~ ￿;￿) (A.5)
where wc (￿) is the compensated wage function, ￿ is indirect utility and g (~ ￿;￿) = p is
the adjustment of p such that, if the marginal rate is increased, the income level is kept
constant. Di⁄erentiating (A.5) with respect to ~ ￿ gives
w
c
~ ￿ = w~ ￿ + wpg~ ￿ (A.6)
We de￿ne V ￿ (~ ￿;p) = V (w￿ (~ ￿;p)) as the indirect utility function. Substituting g (~ ￿;￿)
for p and ￿xing indirect utility at ￿ we can write
V
￿ (~ ￿;g (~ ￿;￿)) = ￿ (A.7)
(A.7) is the so-called compensated indirect utility function. Di⁄erentiating it with respect
to ~ ￿ yields





Making use of the envelope theorem we ￿nd V ￿
~ ￿ and V ￿
p as
dV (w￿ (~ ￿;p);~ ￿)
d~ ￿
=




~ ￿ = ￿wL (A.9)
dV (w￿ (~ ￿;p);p)
dp
=




p = ￿L (A.10)
8Thus g~ ￿ = ￿w. Putting pieces together we can write
w
c
~ ￿ = w~ ￿ ￿ wpw = (Vww)
￿1 L (A.11)
Right-to-manage model
Let pro￿ts be de￿ned by










with ￿rst order condition
￿w = ￿￿Vw + (1 ￿ ￿)V ￿w = 0 (A.14)
As before we can derive the partial derivatives by making use of the implicit function
theorem.














Given that the second-order condition ￿ww < 0 holds, the sign of w~ ￿ depends on @Vw
@~ ￿ =
L[1 + ￿], since @V
















@p = ￿Lw > 0; @V
@p < 0 and ￿w = ￿L.
In the compensated wage rate function (A.5) g~ ￿ is now given by g~ ￿ = ￿￿￿
~ ￿=￿￿
p, with

































￿1 ￿￿L < 0 (A.17)
9For both models of trade union behaviour we can derive (5) in the following way. The
total di⁄erential of w is given by
dw = w~ ￿d~ ￿ + wpdp (A.18)
Making use of
dS = wLds + Ldp + sLdw + (sw + p)Lwdw











! = 0 (A.19)
and thus











we can ￿nally write



































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
dS=0
=












which corresponds to Equation (20) in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996).
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